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Bullet Points to the Pacific Pivot: BRICS, TPP, MDG

July 18, 2014

brics bricksIn June, the Center for Strategic and International Studies released “Power and Order in Asia,” a survey of regional expectations concerning the rebalance.[1]  The survey asked a series of questions to non-governmental experts in the region. CSIS identified 150 candidates each in the United States, Japan, South Korea, China, Thailand, Indonesia, India, Australia, Singapore, Burma/Myanmar, and Taiwan. The survey was conducted online between March 24 and April 22, 2014, and there were 402 participants.

The report reads: “Members of the “strategic elite” were identified as nongovernmental experts who are influential in the debate on international and/or Asian regional affairs.”

Despite not knowing who specifically participated, I agree with one of the findings of the report which to paraphrase, finds that regional expectations see China as being the leading economic partner, and the US is seen as the regional security partner.

My position on the Pacific Pivot is: At a time of declining regional economic influence, the Pivot is the US doctrine for remaining strategically and economically relevant in the Asia-Pacific region.

However, unlike the Cold War where economic differences would remain unresolved until Perestroika, economies and investments between the US and China are so intertwined, that conflicts could potentially find compromise within new international agreements like the post-2015 development agenda before the collapse of one system or the other.


One aspect of the Pivot that has not been addressed is the role of China and the BRICS partnership in the Latin American hemisphere.

Note: as of this writing, the “Sixth BRICS Summit – Forteleza Declaration” was just released at the BRICS Summit in Forteleza Brazil.[2] It is as much a manifesto for major economic reform as it is an appeal to move away from the neoliberalism born out of the Washington Consensus. Validating this declaration is the expanding capitalization of its central reserve from not only the Global South, but from the dominant advanced economies like Germany and France. Growing non-dollar based capital inflows will allow BRICS to implement new rules that favor the needs of emerging markets and developing countries (EMDC) over the ambitions of advanced economies and partnerships like the TPP.

BRICS, is the acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, the largest economies outside of the “developed countries” club, and has emerged as an alternative multilateral bloc to the US. By establishing a non-dollar based currency reserve they are able to help capitalize markets in developing countries without imposing punishing deregulatory rules.  One of the key differences undermining the neoliberal investment structure of the Wall St. derived “free-market” system, is that BRICS investments are State-owned.  Global investment markets requires financial transparency in foreign direct investments (FDI) so that investors can be assured that their investments are secure and they will get their investments returned within the agreed upon scheduled timetable.

State-owned investments have no such requirements, and as a result, can bypass the so-called transparency process and create alternative debt-relief programs that developing countries prefer.  Geographically, BRICS countries are located in South America, Africa, Eastern Europe, Asia and South Asia, and are leading partners in regional trade groups.  This alliance allows far greater opportunities for countries to develop their own markets than having to conform to strict US or EU obligations.

BRICS capitalization has evolved into a powerful platform as a counter-narrative to the neo-liberal institutions on key international issues.

On the sidelines of last year’s G-20, for example, BRICS reaffirmed their capitalization of $100 billion in development and expressed their concern over the IMF’s “credibility, legitimacy and effectiveness,”[3] and after a private meeting between Obama and Putin, Obama called off the Syria strike that he was proposing before Congress.[4]

From the perspective of the US, there may not have been enough financial support to challenge Russia’s commitment to the Assad regime. When the Secretary of State Kerry met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Switzerland following the G-20 summit in St. Petersburg, there was still controversy over whether it was Assad or the rebels who used chemical weapons on civilians, citing a doctored video that showed “incontrovertible truth,” to those claims. In this meeting, they discussed the conditions of Russian diplomacy and how they would secure the chemical weapons after Syria’s full compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.[5]

 “FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV: (Via interpreter) As far as who is going to pay, I think that you heard that there were countries who were ready to pay for the war, and I’m sure that there will be such countries, perhaps not the same countries, who will be ready to finance the peaceful solution of the problem.”

What came out of the G-20 St. Petersburg Action Plan was that the US would implement further structural reforms that would ensure that “large financial institutions retain enough bail-in able debt to facilitate orderly resolution.”[6] “Bail-ins” are where creditors are forced to take losses when banks are rescued, and are designed to help make the “too-big-to-fail” banking institutions feel safer.[7] In other words, what Lavrov was referring to was that the US could not afford Syria and that the creditor countries like China holds the reins of financing those debts.

In an interview on Democracy Now, Joseph Stiglitz said, “I think it’s difficult for the United States to accept the notion it’s no longer the largest country. It’s no longer the largest country in trade, in savings, in other areas, but this will be the second-largest country in the world,” while BRICS has the ability to “create a fund that can bring in not only countries, but Sovereign wealth funds, to use not just debt but equity.”[8]

It is for these structural financial conditions that BRICS capitalization in Latin America may soon be seen as a potential threat to National Security as it challenges the long held regional dominance the US has held over the 35-member Organization of American States (OAS).

The emergence of a China-funded Nicaragua Canal that also includes two Russian outposts (not to be confused with “bases”)[9] provides a China/Russia partnership far greater economic cooperation with Latin American countries that make up both ALBA and Mercosur trade groups.[10] The Nicaragua Canal, for example, would give China and Russia direct access to Cuba which has been under the thumb of US sanctions since 1959 and present unprecedented trade options with Latin America.

Revolving within the BRICS sphere are ALBA, the Bolivarian Alliance (Antigua, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and Venezuela); and Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and again, Venezuela).  Notably absent is the “Pacific Alliance” that includes TPP countries Mexico, Peru and Chile, as well as Colombia (which has a US FTA). There can be no misreading that the Pacific Alliance is a wall separating China from Mercosur partners and that the Nicaragua Canal penetrates that wall.

The new Russia-China Partnership (RCP) and the Mercosur-Alba relationship gives unprecedented opportunities for Asia-Pacific trade and developing countries, globally, particularly with the new Nicaragua Canal being developed.

On July 11, Putin met Castro signing a law writing off 90 percent of Cuba’s $35 billion debt, and signed 33 co-operation pacts, including the expansion of Russian military presence in Cuba. [11] [12]

US-CAFTA-DR includes Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Dominican Republic and it is the third largest export market in Latin America, behind Mexico and Brazil. China’s influence in Latin America presents a welcome alternative to the privatization models as practiced by the US/Wall St. investment regime. As of yet, it is unclear of how the U.S. will respond to closer China/Russia-Latin America relations, or what kind of legal obligations CAFTA-DR members have with the US should China become a more dominant trade partner. Considering new global motivations, I wonder if we need to speak about the Pivot in it’s plural “Pacific Pivot(s).”

There is a geopolitical element to the TPP that encompasses ports and shipping routes and perhaps I can provide a more detailed mapping elsewhere, but if we view these trade agreements not only as a means to liberalize tariffs of goods and the implementation of services and infrastructure, we should also consider the TPP/TTIP as an obstructionist policy responding to the shift of economic power in the region.

In its concrete application, trade-of-goods is also about global transport, transparency (investment) and tariffs (taxation).  Streamlining the flow of goods is something that all the dominant economies seek and I don’t think there is much discrepancy between the US and China over how quickly goods move from seed to table. But as an obstructionist barrier defined within WTO rules, the US can still play traffic cop in the high seas and at the ports controlling the physical supply chain.

There are also other international conventions that can be used to re-route shipping, stop and check for human or drug trafficking, illegal weapons transport, or other forms of smuggling.  Additionally, countries that are not a part of the TPP could face longer delays due to red tape while TPP members are given priorities at the docks. This could be a boon for emerging markets and developing countries locked into a partnership with the US, provided that China’s growth is limited.

U.S. forward military deployments in Asia and the Pacific.

Overseas military deployments have been a defining part of US strategy since the Cold War, and its redirection to the Asia-Pacific serves to facilitate strategic and economic partnerships that are and have been obstructionist by design.

US-based Regional Alliances

Japan is most central to US alliances in the Asia-Pacific having signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement in 1954, and following that, the Trilateral Security Initiative signed in 2006 with Japan and Australia.

Regional countries who already have signed Free-Trade Agreements (FTAs) or other Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs) with US include South Korea, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. These FTAs and TIFAs have security provisions that are tied to US foreign direct investment (FDI).[13]

FDI Confidence Indexes, like A.T.Kearney, ranks countries based on how changes in their political, economic, and regulatory systems are likely to affect foreign direct investment inflows.[14] Security is included in this data, and counties involved with the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement are likely to be moving towards greater security partnerships with the U.S.

US occupations, territories and administrations in the Pacific include Hawaii, American Samoa, Guam, Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands.

The US is negotiating closer relations with the Pacific Island Forum via the Pacific Plan, which would include economic and security provisions with Pacific Small Island States.

Chinese military?

China has been more inclined to appeal to the international community to challenge U.S. regional aggression. As a last resort China’s military defense of their regional allies occurred as a response to U.S. foreign policy, as with both proxy wars against “communism” that the US waged in the region: the support of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and Vietnam’s “Resistance War Against America.”

If we account for the military and economic cooperation that the US provided the Republic of China against the People’s Republic of China in 1949 regarding the occupation of Taiwan, one could argue—as China’s representative to the U.N., Wu Hsiu-Chuan did before the UN Security Council in 1950– that the “armed invasion and occupation of Taiwan by the United States Government is an act of aggression in that it is a flagrant intervention in China’s domestic affairs and armed occupation of Chinese territory.”[15]

China has refrained from escalating regional military conflicts, and any provocations that have been pursued by China have been limited by the fact that the US was the only country to have used nuclear weapons on a civilian population (twice) and were/are seen as capable of doing so again.

Territorial disputes in the South/East China Sea?

In part, these territorial disputes are motivated as a means to wage nationalist campaigns against China, and justify the U.S. forward military deployments in the Asia Pacific. The fact that these tensions coincide with FTAs and TIFAs should not be lost on anyone, particularly since Beijing has been willing to shelve these disputes, to “maintain the status quo and ensure regional stability” before these disputes are resolved.[16]  China seeks bilateral resolutions to these disputes through ASEAN, while the US has been pushing for a multi-lateral resolution through UNCLOS, whose EEZ mandates do little to resolve the differences.[17]

It is arguable whether minerals and oil and gas resources are the sole-driving force between these disputes.  Heightened tensions in the South China Seas provides an opportunity for the US to steer regional attitudes that provide the US with authority to police a super-highway of shipping lanes. By creating what the Energy Information Administration calls “World Oil Transit Chokepoints,” the U.S. can control the transport of about half of the world’s oil production that is critical to global energy security.[18]

Referencing the UNCLOS EEZ mandates,[19] the US may be embracing the same territorial administrative position that China is being accused of abusing.  By imposing administrative authority over many of the US administered shoals, territories and islands throughout the Pacific, Obama is seeking to create a 2 million square kilometer Pacific Remote Islands Marine National Monument “ocean preserve” by Executive Order. Managed by the Department of the Interior and the Navy, the US could re-route shipping lanes from Asia to the Americas encompassing the region between Hawaii, the Marianas and American Samoa.[20]


Alternatives to a traditional and militarized struggle for power in the South/East China Sea?

As long as commodity assets and manufacturing resources continue to play a dominant role in the investment regime and the financial system, advanced economies are going to continue to assert hegemony and empire.

The tensions between axis and allied powers that led to WWII have roots in the accounting of commodity assets and resources as a primary indicator of national economic strength.  In global exchange at that time, the strength of international trade was measured by the accounting of commodity assets resulting in competition for strategic resources. Since the value of national currencies were measured by the goods and services these commodity assets produced, the post-war planners following the principle points of the Atlantic Charter viewed that it was the economic structure of colonialism that contributed to World War.  The United Nations and Bretton Woods changed the economic frame, recognizing that if administering powers ceased to exploit territories as a means to funnel commodity assets and resources into their national economies, future world wars could be prevented.

Expanding upon this 60+ year-old policy analysis, if we prioritize ecological bio-diversity within this accounting over resources, and begin to measure these resources in a way that would further facilitate global ecological regulatory demands, possibilities over a next “world war” would be greatly reduced.

In the struggle to reverse climate change, ecological biodiversity demands that we enter into a new formalized relationship over the stewardship of shared resources.  The current System of Environmental-Economic Accounting (SEEA) adopted by the UN System of National Accounts continues to pursue the model of privatization and financialization, while the smaller resource-rich developing countries are, as of yet, unable to provide an alternative to the Wall St. dominated neo-liberal system.[21]

Knowing beforehand that outdated neoliberal economic policy is holding back both climate change reduction, global peace and stability should be included as a priority in our discussions.  Additionally, climate change security in fragile/developing countries are a good use of international peacekeepers and should not be an excuse for further militarization.[22]
North-South Korean relations and Obama policy of “strategic patience”

North Korea remains very resource rich and is one of the few countries that have managed to keep their resources nationalized despite the global neoliberal push that occurred after Perestroika.  It is widely believed that for many who seek reunification, the first objective would be to access North Korea’s bounty of resources.  Unlike the US, and by proxy the Republic of Korea, China has not been actively provoking or trying to undermine DPRK sovereignty as North Korea provides China with strategic access to the East Sea.

Just as the Bosphorus Strait and the Crimea are Russia’s access points for shipping routes to the Mediterranean and Africa, a developed North Korean port provides China with year-round shipping to the East Sea, increasing the supply of resources down to China’s manufacturing corridor in the East China Sea.  Although, China has access to Russia’s port in Vladivostok, the port is not operational year-round due to ice.  From China’s perspective, reunification between DPRK and ROK at this time would likely jeopardize China’s access, and how we view the ongoing destabilization efforts occurring on the Korean peninsula should include this context of containment.

When the port at Najin-Sonbong near the Russia-China-North Korea border becomes more active and the railway connecting China’s “ghost cities” to the port with China and Russia become fully operational, I anticipate that we could see a reduction of this “policy of patience.”

Japan’s Regional Militarization

By themselves, each of the following three examples, should give the region worry:  Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s gutting of the Constitution’s war-renouncing Article Nine; the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement; and the Trilateral Security Initiative. The three together, however, coupled with the potential conclusion of the TPP Agreement, expands the integration of investment and militarization.

The nuclear lessons of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (and to some extent Fukushima) are inseparable from Japanese expansionism, lessons that clearly reside in the consciousness of the people as evidenced by mass protests.[23]

“The right of collective self-defense” provides Japan’s defense contractors with an opportunity to engage more competitively in the international defense market. With Japan’s inclusion in the TPP negotiations, this could potentially give defense contractors like Mitsubishi opportunities to compete alongside Boeing and Lockheed-Martin, for example. The renouncing of Article 9 as a deregulatory defense ruling and motivated by the TPP, highlights what the “strategic economic” in Trans Pacific Strategic Economic Cooperation really means.  Also from an investment aspect, Japan is the largest development partner for the Asian Development Bank, whose regional development partnerships in Papua New Guinea may be less secure if PNG moves toward closer relations with the recently announced BRICS Development Bank.[24][25]

If Japan’s renouncement of Article Nine anticipates a state of perpetual war, then Japan’s commitments to their development partnerships suggests that Japan will seek to conclude the TPP despite fierce opposition from various trade sectors.

Japanese-Chinese dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

The timeline of the long-contested Senkaku/Diaoyu islands coincide with Japan’s entry into TPP negotiations.  As a metaphor for Japanese-Chinese relations, we should expect the islands to remain contested and its national status remain unresolved.  I’m ambivalent to the resource extraction argument, because if it is simply a matter of nationalizing resources it should not be difficult to create a bilateral partnership. The disputed islands issue in general is a symbolic struggle that creates the façade of legitimacy for US regional militarization and justification for PM Abe to revise Article Nine.

On TPP, BRICS and the 2015 Millennium Development Goals

As discussed, the TPP should be seen as more than a Free-Trade Agreement that seeks to liberalize costs on the trade of goods and services between and amongst the 12 partner countries, amounting to about a $28 trillion GDP (nominal) partnership.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership, as well as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) concurrently being negotiated between the US and the EU seeks to impose rules of trade and investment that are directed towards, and will primarily affect emerging markets and developing countries. These rules over trade and investment seek to concurrently limit the influence of BRICS’ State-owned investments and enterprises in developing countries, and it should be noted that BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) partners are excluded from both the TPP and the TTIP.

The BRICS partners are all classified by the IMF as “Emerging and Developing Economies” and includes “all countries that are not classified as advance economies.”[26] In part, because BRICS understands the needs and limitations of emerging markets and developing countries and is able to practice debt relief, they are quickly becoming a fraternal aid donor for Global South partners, seeking alternatives from debilitating austerity measures enforced by Wall St. and World Bank rules.

In an interesting turn of events, the WTO has recently “struck a blow to US efforts to challenge the role in global commerce of state-owned companies in emerging economies after ruling against Washington in a dispute over the punitive tariffs it imposed on steel and other imports from China and India.”[27] Favoring Wall St. investment rules, The US has been trying to impose rules against state-owned enterprises and this has been one of the strategic issues with the TPP.

In terms of the Pacific Pivot, I’ve presented the TPP as both a strategic and economic agenda that seeks to maintain the hegemony between advanced economies and the emerging markets and developing countries that make up the Global South. As the TPP is also a trade agreement seeking to liberalize and undermine regulations protecting the national accounting of goods and services, we should keep in mind that this agreement is being negotiated for the benefit of not only the largest corporations, but the neoliberal free-market system as well.

I’m going to take a different approach that will illustrate how TPP and BRICS are competing for control over emerging via the UN Millennium Development Goals.[28]

Since 2008, economic data suggests that the US leadership in global economic policy is dangling on a thread that could potentially unravel very quickly, and it is in the interest of the US to quickly stitch together a fabric of legitimacy on many of the issues that have gained international repudiation in the last five years.  For many, the loss in manufacturing, as well as mounting trade deficits have been blamed on China’s “currency manipulation” and non-transparent “state-owned investments.”[29]  Generally speaking, the reality is that developing economies have found more rewarding fraternity and trade with China and the other BRICS partners.

Trade-in-Goods profiles show a continued deficit in goods as higher labor costs in the US and EU make it difficult for corporate manufacturers to compete in global markets.  When we talk about commercial services, however, the advanced economies have an inverse relationship to the global market and we see a widening surplus in the financial, insurance, entertainment, pharmaceutical, R&D, tourism sectors.[30]  It’s important to note that these differences in the goods market and services market are generally drawn along the lines of advanced economies and the Global South.

The UN System of National Accounts is the national accounting arm of the UN Statistical Division and is integrated into the international financial institutions. For the UNSD, the convention for the designation of “developed” and “developing” countries does not express the same criteria for expressing the economic “maturity” of a country as IMF and World Bank indicators do. The SNA uses these terms to express statistical information to measure GDP and other kinds of national economic indicators.[31]

This is an important distinction, because revisions that are currently being proposed at the national accounting level will determine, for example, how ecological indicators will be accounted for. Specifically, how the privatization/nationalization of forests, oceans, and biodiversity could be accounted and integrated into debt, balance of payments, and other trade indicators.[32]

Overall, developing countries are rich in commodity resources and the SNA has already begun to revise national indicators adopting environmental-economic rules to include resource depletion and environmental degradation as deficits.  Although these rules have not yet been implemented yet, it appears that the dominant economies seek to be able to account for investments to “protect” biodiversity in foreign countries, including the insurance on losses. This environmental revision would be included in “Balance of Payments” transactions reflecting the creation, transformation, exchange, transfer, or extinction of economic value involving changes in ownership, of goods or assets, the provision of services, labor or capital.[33]


Current Balance of Payments in billions (OECD: 2012)
US -$440.4 billion
China $ 193 billion

The nearly $600 billion dollar difference in Balance of Payments (BoP) between China and the US reflect changing relationships between “advanced economies” and “emerging markets and developing economies”, where the advanced economies of the EU and the US share large deficits in BoP, while on average, the Global South share in either a surplus or relatively small deficit in their BoP.

A caveat to the dominance of advanced economies leading SNA revisions is that with launch of the new BRICS Development Bank, the newly formed BRICS National Institutes of Statistics can potentially change statistical indicators to better reflect the interests and needs of the Global South.

Should the TPP/TTIP conclude, revisions to the national accounting systems could likely begin to close some of these differences in favor of the advanced economies.  Should they not, it leaves the US/EU partnerships in a precarious situation, one that could damage the US/EU standing in the investment and security rating system.

Percentage Debt to GDP, Gross (IMF:2012)
US %106.5
China %22.8

The Millennium Development Goals is being built on an Aid for Trade privatization model, which seeks to streamline donor countries access to development sectors in exchange for resources.[34]  The competition will either give BRICS state-owned investments and enterprises the advantage of writing these rules, or perpetuate the investor-led financialization of Wall St./World Bank neoliberalism—or there will evolve some other kind of compromise. How this investment process will be determined appears to be through a global economic mandate, of which the GDP revisions are key indicators.

Should TTIP/TPP conclude, for example, we would very likely see the US-led trade partnership assert binding rules that would privilege neoliberal institutions. However, as more and more developing countries begin to align themselves with BRICS, and begin to shift their trade reserves away from the US, we could begin to see these rules evolve in a more integrated way through regional co-operations like ASEAN or MERCOSUR.

2012 Global GDP, nominal (IMF) = $74 trillion

Advanced Economies $45.3 trillion
36 countries
US $16.2 trillion
EU $16.7 trillion
TTIP + TPP = $45 trillion

Emerging Markets Developing Countries $29 trillion
157 countries
China $8.2 trillion
BRICS $14.7 trillion
ASEAN $2.3 trillion
MERCOSUR $3.2 trilllion

The MDG development agenda include the food and water, education, pharmaceutical, financial, health, housing and environmental sectors.  The MDG will provide a process for streamlining investors and corporations with enormous opportunities to open markets that represent billions of people that the World Bank has classified as “developing.”

2013 Global Population = 7.1 billion
Advanced Economies = 1 billion
EMDC = 6 billion

MDG sectors include poverty and hunger, universal primary education, gender equality and empowerment, child mortality, maternal health, HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, and environmental sustainability.

Although there are vast disparities within the measurement range, this is of the average GDP per capita measured by countries.

Advanced Economies = $43,000 (range: Latvia $15,205 – Luxembourg $110,423)
EMDC = $7,000 (range: Malawi $222 – Qatar $100,260)


India is the tenth largest economy in the world behind China, Brazil and Russia. Per capita, it is also one of the poorest, ranked 145 out of 190 (nominal, World Bank).  India is one of the largest potential markets in terms of investment sectors outlined by the 2015 Millennium Development Goals.  These include: extreme poverty and hunger, universal primary education, gender equality and empowerment, child mortality, maternal health, HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, and environmental sustainability. The competition over the “poverty” market in India is perhaps greater than anywhere else and is inextricably linked to both resource extraction and financialization by transnational corporations representing all development sectors.

If the TPP/TTIP were to be concluded, the rules of investment and trade would be applied across the board to all sectors and it would provide billions of dollars of revenue to international shareholders at the expense of the emerging markets and developing countries that will essentially have opened their doors to a convoluted Aid for Trade program.

For the U.S., exploiting whatever cracks that may exist between India and China could at least provide the investment regime with a greater share of India’s poverty market to be pried open.  Even though attempts have been made to do such, it is doubtful that at this time, the U.S. can persuade India to abandon BRICS. Too many countries are capitalizing their reserve assets towards BRICS.

Alternative ways the U.S. might “pivot” attention

I can think of no exception where “constructive engagement” does not attach a policy of Wall St. style financialization and privatization.  Whether we are speaking about catastrophe bonds (natural or man-made), poverty and hunger, universal education, gender equality, child mortality, maternal health, pharmaceuticals or environmental sustainability, every instance of 21st century government aid comes attached with proposals for privatizing infrastructure that benefits some aspect of the financial and investment sectors.

Having said that, alternative ways that the U.S. might “pivot” attention, would be for the U.S. to shift their priorities towards maximizing the development of technologies that benefit bio-diversity and indigenous peoples.  If the U.S. led national accounting revisions to include resource depletion and ecological degradation as a deficit in the national accounting system, and began to promote bio-diversity at the same level as “national security,” this would shift the investment from a goods and services economy to an economy that emphasizes well-being and bio-diversity.

Additionally, if the U.S. pivoted towards a moratorium on the investment of resource depleting and ecologically degrading R&D and other ecologically degrading technologies; and if the U.S. co-operated to facilitate this mainframe across all industrialized countries and economies, then justifying some kind of a regulatory police presence to reduce the negative impacts leading to global climate change might be seen as constructive.

Anything less is opportunistic and hegemonic.


[1] Green, Michael J., Szechenyi. “Power and Order in Asia: A Survey of Regional Expectations.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. June 2014. PDF file.

[2] BRICS. “Sixth BRICS Summit – Forteleza Declaration.” Web. 15 July 2014.

[3] G-20. “BRICS Leaders meet ahead of the G20 Summit in St.Petersburg.” Russia G-20. Web. 5 Sept 2013.

[4] BBC. “Syria Crisis: Barack Obama calls off Congress Vote.” International Policy Digest. 11 September 2013.

[5] Kerry, John. “Remarks with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov After Their Meeting.” US Department of State. Geneva, Switzerland. 14 September 2013.

[6] G-20. “St. Petersburg Action Plan.” Russia G-20. September 2013. PDF.

[7] Masters, Brooke. “IMF looks at ‘bail-in’ regimes for banks.” Financial Times. Web. 24 April 2012.

[8] Goodman, Amy. Interview with Joseph Stiglitz. “Web Special: Joseph Stiglitz on TPP, Cracking Down on Corporate Tax Dodgers & New BRICS Bank.” Democracy Now. Web. 17 July 2014.

[9] ITAR-TASS, Interfas. “Russian FM Says Navy Needs ‘Stations’ in Latin America.” Radio Free Europe. Web. 14 July. 2014.

[10] Rogers. Tim. “Putin’s surprise visit to Nicaragua fuels canal rumors.” The Nicaragua Dispatch. Web. 12 July 2014.

[11] GMA/AB. “Vladimir Putin makes official visit to Cuba.” Press TV. Web. 15 July 2014.

[12] Imbert, Sergio. “Castro credits Putin with reviving Cuba-Russia ties.” Latin American Herald Tribune. Web. 15 July 2014.

[13] Masters, Jonathan. “Foreign Investment and U.S. National Security.” Council on Foreign Relations. Web. 21 September, 2013.

[14] A.T. Kearney. “Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Confidence Index.” ATKearney.com. Web

[15] Hsiu-Chuan, Wu. “People’s China Stands for Peace.” United Nations Security Council, Lake Success, N.Y. 28 November 1950.

[16] Penhong, Cai. “ASEAN breaking bottom line of keeping neutral in territorial disputes.” Global Times. Web. 15 May 2014.

[17] Shicun, Wu. Interview with Gabriel Dominguez. “Beijing ‘prepared to defend rights’ in South China Sea” DW. Web. 20 May 2014

[18] U.S. Energy Information Administration. “World oil transit checkpoints.” Web. 22 18 2012.

[19] IMO. “Implications of the United National Convention on the Law of the Sea for the International Maritime Organization.” International Maritime Organization. PDF. 19 January 2012.

[20] VOA News. “US Proposal would create world’s largest marine sanctuary,” Voice of America. Web. 17 June 2014.

[21] United Nations Statistics Division. “System of Environmental-Economic Accounting (SEEA)” UNSD. Web.

[22] International Institute for Sustainable Development, “Climate Change and Security.” IISD.org. Web.

[23] McCurry, Justin. “Japan PM to overturn pacifist defence policy,” The Guardian. Web. 30 June 2014.

[24] AFP. “Gas exports, aid takes center-stage as Abe visits PNG.” Japan Today. Web. 11 July 2014.

[25] Daniel, Frank Jack. “Shanghai most likely headquarters for BRICS development bank.” Reuters. Web. 14 July 2014.

[26] IMF, “Statistical Appendix 2013.” International Monetary Fund. PDF. April 2013.

[27] Donnan, Shawn. “WTO rules against China state companies.” Financial Times. Web. 15 July 2014.

[28] UN. “The Eight Millennium Development Goals.” United Nations MDG. Web.

[29] Bergsten, Fred C. “Currency Manipulation, the US Economy, and the Global Economic Order.” Peterson Institute for International Economics. Web. December 2012.

[30] WTO. “Trade Statistics 2013.”  World Trade Organization. PDF.

[31] United Nations Statistics Division. “Updating the System of National Accounts (SNA)” UNSTATS.UN. Web.

[32] United Nations Statistics Division. “About the Revision of the SEEA.” UNSTATS.UN. Web.

[33] OECD. “Balance of Payments” OECD.StatsExtracts. Web.

[34] WTO. “Millennium Development Goals, Aid for Trade,” World Trade Organization. Web.

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