

Tape No. 12-4-2-84

## ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW

with

Daniel Aoki (DA)

October 24, 1984

Pālolo, O'ahu

BY: Chris Conybeare (CC) and Warren Nishimoto (WN)

WN: Okay, Mr. Aoki, John Burns was first elected delegate to Congress in 1956 where he defeated Mrs. Farrington, but in '54, he lost to Mrs. Farrington. Can you give me what you remember about that '54 election?

DA: The '54 election. . . . Well, let's put it this way. Mr. Burns has been the organizer of the Democratic party as far back as I can remember, and being the organizer, you know, you alienated a lot of people at the same time as well as friends. Well, people never took Burns seriously as a candidate. And as a matter of fact, we had difficulty trying to sell Burns to our own group to run as a delegate in 1954. And he became a candidate in the very last minute. It might be interesting for me to tell you that the gang was interested in Ernest Heen as a delegate. And the group had appointed Mike Tokunaga and myself to approach Ernest Heen--Bill Heen, no, Ernest Heen, that's right, the younger one--to be the delegate. And he held us up to the very last minute, but we had Burns's papers all done, ready, so 11, quarter to 12 or so, we just put Burns's paper in. That's how he became a candidate. But as I said, no one took him seriously as a candidate. The unions didn't buy him for the election. We didn't get any kind of support at all. However, he lost the election by just 800 votes. In other words, 400 votes either way would have made the difference. And when that came about, people realized that he can be elected. And this is why, in 1956, I think, he was more successful in the election.

CC: What kinds of things happened between those two elections? Did he go mend some fences, or did you consolidate some support in the unions? Or were some of those things overcome for the next election?

DA: I think the results of the '54 elections proved that Burns was a viable candidate, and consequently, we didn't have to do much selling. But they realized that he could be elected, and therefore we got more support in '56. And so, it was a much easier campaign. [Nineteen] fifty-four was an uphill campaign for us all the way. We just had a handful of people that thought that he could be elected. But in '56, we had a pretty good campaign going.

WN: What do you think went in the minds of the voters? Obviously, they made a big turnaround because the '56 election was very lopsided. What do you think the electorate thought as they changed their minds from Farrington to Burns?

DA: I don't know that there was a drastic change. Because if you recall, in 1954 elections, that was the first time that we won the majority in the state legislature. We had an overwhelming Democratic victory. I think the only one that we missed was electing Burns delegate. So, the fact that he had made a good showing in '54 only proved that he can be elected, and therefore, we got the people to support him in '56. But the major thrust was in '54, when we were able to get the majority into the legislature. And as I said earlier, when the majority Democrats in '54 that got elected--and in the session of '55--when they proved that they. . . . You know, as I told you, Millard Purdy came up and says the Democrats keep 85 percent of their promises. I think that proved to the people that, hey, these Democrats are for real. I think that had a great deal to do as far as getting Burns elected in '56.

CC: Now, did Burns challenge Farrington on the whole statehood question, about the way to go about it? Or did he promise that he would try to do it differently? I know he promised he would be successful, but obviously, she said that she was for statehood, too, I believe, so. . . .

DA: No, I don't recall that Burns had confronted Mrs. [Farrington] directly. You know, another thing that I might like to mention here, and that is that Mr. Burns was, as they say in Hawaiian, akamai, you know. He was a good prognosticator of politics. And as he viewed the people of Hawai'i, he says the people of Hawai'i are not like the Mainland people. You don't go and slap them in the face back and forth, and name calling, and what have you. And the people of Hawai'i don't quite like that. And so, that's not very successful. And I think you've noticed that many of the so-called Haole candidates are more prone to name calling and more of the rough-and-tumble type of campaigning. Hawai'i candidates are a little more subtle in their campaign. And so, it's got to be a little more positive type of thing.

CC: So, he didn't take Farrington on that way. More so, he just sold himself on his ability to do the job?

DA: That is right. Now, as I think I mentioned this previously too, when Mr. Burns came off the stump in the '56 election, when he outright came out and said, "If I don't bring you statehood in this [term], I will not stand for another election," no one believed that. Neither did I. So, it was more on the positive type of campaigning, I would say.

WN: Who were the Farringtons? Obviously, Mrs. Farrington was able to withstand the '54 Democratic takeover. What kind of people were they?

DA: Well, they were very popular. Standard-bearer for the Republican party. They owned the Star-Bulletin. They had poisoned the minds of the people of Hawai'i for decades. And they had baffled the people, you might say, as far as statehood was concerned. And as I said before, statehood was always an issue for election. And I'll say it again, I don't think they were ever really interested in statehood. They only wanted it as an issue for election. Because I'm sure that they were aware of the consequences of statehood. I don't think they were interested.

WN: Why were they so popular?

DA: Well, I don't know. That was the only thing you could buy, I suppose. That was the only thing in the store. And again, going back again, in ['54], I think we would have elected a delegate, too, if we had a delegate that was a proven candidate, someone that had been elected for some high office, etc. But as I said, Mr. Burns was not a proven candidate at that time in '54. So, we won a majority in the House and the Senate, but we failed to elect the delegate because, as I said, Mr. Burns was not a proven candidate at that time. But subsequently, Mr. Burns got elected in every election he ran. [Burns was defeated by William F. Quinn in the 1959 election for governor.] Just a matter of proving that he was a viable candidate.

CC: There was one he didn't get elected.

DA: There was one. I'll take that back. He was a candidate also in 1948 for [delegate to] Congress, but he was not a serious candidate at that time. He merely put himself, his name, up there merely for the purpose of having people to vote for someone that they. . . . Those that were not interested in voting for Farrington.

CC: He wanted to see a Democrat on there.

DA: That's all it was.

CC: Now, the Statehood Commission was another organization that had a lot of Republicans involved with it. Do you feel that those people were sincere about wanting statehood, or were they more in the same way as the Farringtons interested in promoting their interest in statehood more than statehood itself?

DA: I would go along with you. They were just like the Farringtons. People that were on the commission were merely society people in Hawai'i. Take Lorrin Thurston, who was the chairman of the commission [1955 to 1959]. He was very much against statehood. He outright said so. And he had just changed his position supposedly. And my recollection reading something was that the Territorial Legislature had appropriated a good deal of money for that commission. They even had a secretary in Washington and all that kind of stuff. However, it was just a big show.

CC: Were they a factor, though, that you had to work with in terms of

when you did get to Washington?

DA: Well, when we---when Mr. Burns got to Washington, he did utilize that commission. As a matter of fact, I might say, you know, you shout your interest in a certain project enough and then you get to a point where you're going to have to produce. And this is what did happen. I mean, the Statehood Commission and the people shouted about statehood so much that when they saw it coming, they just had to be part of it or else they would have been left out completely or become a laughingstock. And in that fashion, Mr. Burns utilized the Statehood Commission and the Chamber of Commerce in Hawai'i, and used them to approach the Republican elements in Congress. So, as I said earlier--I'm sure I said this--Mr. Burns utilized every possible means that he had at hand to further his statehood efforts.

WN: Was there any kind of friction or confrontation between the Statehood Commission and Burns?

DA: No. Not much, really. But there was slight confrontation between the Secretary of Interior, [Fred] Seaton, and Governor [William] Quinn. Because Burns told them, "Hey, just stay out of my way. I'm going to get statehood. You people merely mess things up. So just stay out of my way." But, you know, this is why, there're some stories in the history which will tell you that when statehood was passed, he [Burns] called Seaton and I called Quinn, as I recall. "Okay, now the bill has passed, you better come in. The job is done." But until then, he told them, "Just stay out of my way."

CC: I want to get back to that later, but when you went to Congress with Mr. Burns and he was there, how was it different for him? Not having a vote means that he had to, I suppose, operate a little differently than other congressmen.

DA: Oh, yes.

CC: And what did that mean? The fact that he was really there without capability of voting, and how did he go about representing Hawai'i under those circumstances?

DA: It was a real difficult job for Mr. Burns. As you point out, no vote and everything else, that's true. However, he had all the privileges of a congressman except the voting. And he had the privilege of going on the Senate floor as well as in the House. Both floors. And so, the only thing he could do was to sell himself to the leaders of both the House and the Senate. And fortunately, it just happened to be [Sam] Rayburn and Lyndon Johnson. So, he sold himself to Rayburn. You know, it's like anything else, as I saw it. You just got to be sincere about what you really want and what you really believe in and to convince the next person that you are really sincere about it and that's the right thing to do. And I think history will also tell you that Mr. Rayburn was never one of the greatest supporters of statehood. As a matter of fact, he opposed us all the time. It was only Mr. Burns that was able to

convince him of Hawaiian statehood. And Rayburn, in turn, convinced Lyndon Johnson, and that's the way it went. However, as it was pointed out in a recent movie, the fact that the 442 had saved one battalion of the 36th Division and had become the honorary members of Texas, let's put it that way, Burns had used that along with everything else to talk to Rayburn [and] Lyndon Johnson.

CC: So, in some ways, he approached Congress the way you would a political campaign for votes. I mean, he went and met everybody. You said he visited most of the states?

DA: That's right. But, as I said, he visited most of the states merely so that he would be able to understand . . .

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

CC: Well, basically, from what you've said, it sounds like Mr. Burns approached Congress the same way you would approach sort of a political campaign. You said he traveled to all the states. He would make, I guess, appearances at luncheons and things. Maybe you could just tell us the kinds of things that he did and places that you and he went, or that you went. What kinds of things he talked about.

DA: Well, it was, basically, getting to know the people. Know the congressmen and the senators. As I said, selling himself first and being concerned about their problem as well as having them concerned about your problem. And to understand every congressman and senator and why they voted and acted the way they did, Mr. Burns made it a point to travel all the states, as I said. He traveled every state in the union and talked to the people so he could understand the conditions that were behind there and the kind of people that each congressman or senator had to represent. And this way, as long as I knew you or the kind of constituency that you had, then I would understand your behavior, right? And so, I'd be able to work with you much better. Now, he took every possible opportunity that he had. He traveled all the way down to Florida, Indiana, or wherever he was invited to appear on TV programs or what have you. And, I might say, as I mentioned earlier, about the statehood. . . . What was that, now?

CC: Mendel Rivers? No?

DA: Oh, Mendel Rivers was another good example. As I said, he [Burns] was one of only two outsiders from the South that was invited to Mendel Rivers Day in South Carolina. I'm talking about the state society. He used that as an instrument, too. And prior to that, that organization was never used to advance the Hawai'i statehood efforts.

CC: Okay, I think we're out of tape here. We'll have to put another tape in.

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

CC: Why don't you finish telling us the story about how you ended up going to Mendel Rivers Day in South Carolina and what happened.

DA: Well, as I was saying earlier, Mr. Burns befriended all the congressmen that he could befriend. And some of the people were really in high places. People like "Admiral" [Carl] Vinson from Georgia, Mendel Rivers from South Carolina in the Armed Services Committee. Subsequently, as you recall, Mendel Rivers became chairman of the Armed Services Committee when "Admiral" Vinson retired. Well, they have a celebration, Mendel Rivers Day in Charleston, South Carolina every year. Well, Mr. Burns was invited. As I said, he was one of two outsiders [not] from the South that was invited to that function. And Mr. Burns had every intention of going to that celebration because he was seriously working with the Southern representatives as well. Well, it so happened that Mr. Burns had to come home to Hawai'i when the Mendel Rivers celebration was going to take place. And so, he says, "Dan, you're going to have to go to Charleston, South Carolina to represent me."

"Charleston, South Carolina?" I says, "Oh, no way. No thanks."

That's when he says, "Say, Dan, there are lot of things that I do that I don't want to do, but I've got to do because I'm the delegate of the people of Hawai'i." And he says, "So, you, being my assistant, you're going have to do many things that you don't want to do, but you're going to have to do. And this is one of them."

I says, "Oh, my God."

So, he says, "You got any kind of medal from the war?"

I says, "I only got a bronze medal."

So he says, "Well, get one of those . . . "

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

CC: Maybe you can just start with where he told you some things you're going to have to do.

DA: Yeah. Well, he said, "You know, there are many things that I do which I don't want to do just because I'm the delegate for the people of Hawai'i." So, he says, "You're going to do the same thing. Because you're my assistant, you're going to have to do some of the things that you don't want to do. ~~But you just have to do it.~~ And this is one of them."

Then he asked me if I had any medals from the Second World War. And I says, "Well, the only medal I got is the bronze medal."

So, he says, "Well, get yourself. . . . Do you have one of the pins?"

I says, "Yeah. I have."

He says, "Well, you wear it."

I says, "What the hell should I wear that for?"

He says, "No, I want you to wear it."

And so, I got all dressed and went to the office that morning. And he says, "Where's the medal? Where's that pin?"

I says, "Ah, I don't have to wear that stuff."

He says, "I told you, you need it. Now, you get your 'okole downtown and you get yourself one of the pins and you put it on."

So I had to run all the way downtown, pick up a pin, put it on. And then we went out to Andrews Airport. Air Force plane was ready for Mendel Rivers and his entourage. And we went all the way down. Oh, I might also mention that before Burns made this switch, he called Mendel Rivers. He says he couldn't make it and he asked if it's okay for him to send me in his place. And Mendel Rivers says, "Sure. Fine. Send him over."

And so he [Burns] says, "Hey, wait. I'm just going to have to tell you, you know who my assistant is?" He told him that I was not one of their people, you know. I'm a little different.

So, he says, "That's all right." That was fine. So Burns asked another friend of his, a congressman from South Carolina, comes from the opposite end of Mendel Rivers. William Jennings Bryan Dorn. And he comes from Greenwood, which is the extreme west end of South Carolina. He was a wonderful guy. And so, Burns asked him, "Hey. How about taking care of my assistant? He's going to go in my place." So, he was a very congenial guy. So, I got along very well. He took good care of me. And we flew down to South Carolina. We landed at Mendel Rivers Airport. And as we went parading through town, they says, "Look, that's what Mendel Rivers brought, that's what Mendel Rivers brought, that's what Mendel Rivers brought." You know, the veterans' hospital and what have you. Everything in Charleston was Mendel Rivers. And so, we went to The Citadel. And as I said, I think I mentioned this earlier, those cadets there paraded for us. I always paraded for the dignitaries, but this time, I was on the opposite end, reviewing the troops. When it was all over, the commandant there at The Citadel had invited the people there, Mendel Rivers and his group, who went to his residence. And naturally, I'm the last, right? All the congressmen go in, then I was the last. And I look up there and I says, "My God, General Clark." Mark Clark. I looked up at Mark Clark and I shook hands with him. I said, "You know, General," I says, "I never thought I'd get this close to you."

He looked at me. He says, "Well." He says, "Are you with the 100th?"

I says, "No, I was with the 442nd."

He says, "Well." Then he put his arms around me, and turned me around, and addressed the whole group, and told them, you know, what a great job the 442nd had done. Great soldiers that they were and so forth and so on. And that kind of set me up for the whole trip down in South Carolina and made it much easier.

CC: Didn't hurt to have General Clark's backing.

DA: It was a great help, yes.

WN: Were there any other kinds of incidents you remember going by yourself or with Burns to a certain area that you remember?

DA: We drove out to Detroit. Then after we got through with that show, we went down all the way down to Florida, to Miami. And it was a very nice trip. We stayed at Key Biscayne. I didn't realize how big Miami was, though. But it was, you know, things like that. Of course, many times, Burns would combine trips with other things, so I didn't join him. If he couldn't go, we always had somebody go. You know, we had Mr. Burns's eldest son in our office. And he made speeches all different places, too, and talking to different people.

CC: What kind of impressions did you really get of the Mainland and seeing all. . . . You really got to see an awful lot of what people were thinking about and what was going on all over the country at that period of time. What kinds of things impressed you about those years?

DA: Well, primarily, at that time, the one thing I noticed was that the people in the Mainland did not know Hawai'i. This was even true, worse, when I went there [with] the 442nd going cross-country. You tell them that we're from Hawai'i and they says, "Oh, where's Hawai'i? In the Philippines someplace?" You know? People were not too aware of where Hawai'i was and what Hawai'i was all about. Now I might mention this, that after we were successful in getting statehood, as you know, the migration to Hawai'i increased tremendously. And I think the only reason for that was because when we became the fiftieth state, then the people realized, "Hey, that's part of United States." They didn't have the same feeling when we were a territory. They thought that we were a foreign country. And just the simple thing of taking inoculations and what have you for traveling purposes. They thought that to come to Hawai'i they needed to take all that kind of shots and clearance and what have you. But once we became a state, well, they realized that in the Mainland, as you know, you drive from one state to the other. You never know when you cross the borders of each state. And so, when we became a fiftieth state, I believe people began to feel it's no difference going to Hawai'i than going from one state to the other. And so, ever since statehood, as I said, the population here, the migration from the Mainland has been tremendous.



CC: So, you really had to overcome a lot of just general ignorance about the situation. People just didn't know at all.

DA: That's for sure.

CC: And that allowed a lot of the rumors, and some of the tactics-- there were some fairly manipulative critics of statehood who talked about Communism or talked about racial problems and things like that. You really had to sort of overcome people's . . .

DA: Now that you mention it, yeah, I believe that was very true. The fact that they did not know the people of Hawai'i, the fact that they did not know the makeup of Hawai'i made it very possible for them to believe lot of these things that were said about Hawai'i. Because the only thing they knew was that one-third of the population was Caucasian. So, as Mr. Burns pointed out, "I'm here asking for statehood because of the two-thirds, not the one-third." And he said, "Let me assure you, they might not look like your constituents, but they are as good Americans, if not better Americans, than your constituents." But, so as you point out, ignorance of Hawai'i made it easier for the people to believe . . .

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

WN: Okay. You were in a high administrative position representing Hawai'i. And this was about ten, eleven years after the war ended. The fact that you were a Japanese in a high administrative position, how did you feel about that and did you get any kind of reactions from other peoples?

DA: I tell you. Mr. Burns got elected delegate and he asked me if I would join him in Washington. Being in Hawai'i is a different situation. I didn't think much about it. I says I'd be very happy to go, you know, whatever it is. Of course, it meant that I had to uproot my whole family and take them up there, not knowing when I was going to come back. It's pretty hard traveling with three children, especially when they are very young. Well, I didn't really think that it was going to be a difficult proposition when I first accepted the position there with Mr. Burns. But when I went to Congress, I found that I was really an ugly duckling there. I was the black duckling in the whole pond. Well, as it turns out, I don't think they ever saw a Japanese fellow up there in Washington or in the Congress. As a matter of fact, I was the first one there working. And so, I really felt out of place. It was difficult for me to work. And I entertained the idea of calling it quits and coming home. I just felt that I was in the wrong place. You know, a square peg in a round hole.

So, just before I went up to Mr. Burns to tell him that I was going to quit and come home, I just thought to myself, "Hey, maybe it's not them. Maybe it's me. I'm the one that's getting the vibes. Maybe I was just interpreting it wrong." You know? So, I kind of changed my attitude about the whole thing. I went around and just

said hello, talk to people. I think it was just a case of selling myself, that I was just like anybody else. That I spoke English, the best that I could, and I could communicate with them. And I joined one group, and another group, and found that I made friends along the way. And the more I was outward about things, I felt, well, wasn't too bad. I was being accepted there. So I was convinced that it was me that was all wrong and it wasn't them. And so, it was just adjusting my own attitude and adjusting myself. And so, oh, it wasn't so bad. And after that, I enjoyed my stay there.

WN: Did anybody bring up the war at all?

DA: Yeah. Mr. Burns had a purpose in taking me up there, I think. As I said earlier, someplace along the way, Mr. Burns was the first delegate ever from Hawai'i to take an entire staff from Hawai'i. Other delegates did have members from Hawai'i in their staff, but lot of these people were people who were going to law school in Washington, D.C. and were working part-time. They were never full-time employees. And they generally hired professionals that ran around in Washington constantly. But Mr. Burns took an entire staff from Hawai'i. He once told me, "Dan, the reason I did that was I wanted the other congressmen and senators to see for themselves that the Hawaiian people could do the job like anybody else can." You see the point there? And this is why he took an entire staff from Hawai'i.

And so, Mr. Burns was confronted with those kind of questions about the 442nd and the 100th. Then there was one congressman who was a veteran. I understand we had a number of veterans, many of them. And they would ask Burns, "What's with these niseis? Why do they fight so hard?" Things like that. And so, Mr. Burns would say, "Well, rather than me trying to explain the situation to you, I have a veteran there from the 442nd." He said, "Why don't you go talk to him? He's in the office." And so, we'll have lunch together or something like that. He'll come up and pointblank ask, "What was it that made you kids fight so hard?"

So, it gave me an opportunity to talk to some congressmen and tell them what I thought. Well, it was a very simple thing. I just told them that, "You went to war, yes, but you had one purpose, that was to fight for this country. That was the same reason I went to war. I fought for this country, that's true. But I had another reason. An added reason. And the fact that we were questioned, and, you know, they wondered whether we were going to fight for this country or the mother country, whatever it was. So we had this second purpose. We had a double purpose where you had just a single purpose." It wasn't necessary for me to go into other details, I'm sure.

CC: Now, the other problem that would seem . . .

END OF SIDE ONE

## SIDE TWO

- CC: ~~I guess the other question that comes to mind in addition to the whole question of Hawai'i's Japanese population, you were also in Congress at really the sort of the tail end, but still, I'm sure, the McCarthy era had some impact on people's thinking. And the whole question of the Red Scare and the propaganda about Hawai'i being infiltrated by Communists, and things like that. Did those questions get raised in very direct ways and how were they dealt with?~~
- DA: By the time we got there, by the time Mr. Burns got there, the McCarthyism, the Red Scare, and so forth, as you say, was at a very tail end. I presume it was a subliminal effect, but, you know, there was no frontal attack on the things like that. I might also point out here, though, that when Mr. Burns got there in 1957--he got elected in '56 and the session started in '57, January--there was some question as to whether they were going to seat Mr. Burns in the Congress or not. And Mr. Burns was a little concerned about that. But when session started and everything else, he had worked it out in such a way that it was no problem at all.
- CC: You mean, there was a question over that kind of problem?
- DA: Yeah. Of course, you know, as I said, Mr. Burns had been accused of being a pinko, of being a Communist follower and things like that. And he was never a Communist, but, by God, they had raked him over the coals, you might say. As I said earlier, you talk about these things often enough, people begin to believe these things, right? And so, Mr. Burns had some question as to whether somebody might bring this thing up and red bait these things around. But nothing did come up. No problem at all.
- CC: So, there were still some undercurrents then . . .
- DA: Well, maybe, yes. But it never surfaced to any extent, no.
- CC: Warren, why don't you . . .
- WN: Bill Quinn defeated John Burns for governor in '59. What happened? Why do you think that happened?
- DA: Well, let's say, number one, I think Mr. Quinn was a very attractive individual, attractive candidate. Bill Quinn was the governor of the territory of Hawai'i. He was here all the time. He was in front of the people constantly, whereas you had Delegate Burns who was in Washington. Yes, he [Burns] brought statehood, but, as I said before, the statehood issue was kind of running out of gas. And when statehood did come by, yeah, there were lot of excitement and what have you, but it was sort of a, well, "it finally did come" kind of an attitude.
- Now, some people say that had Mr. Burns come home and taken the

bows that he should have done and things like that, maybe things would have helped. But I just want to point out and remind you of what I said earlier. As I said, Mr. Burns had utilized every possible means with the Chamber of Commerce coming up to Congress to help with the statehood effort. And Mr. Walker was the president of the Chamber of Commerce, I think it was. And when Burns was successful in getting statehood passed in Congress, I told you that he received a wire from Mr. Walker. And Mr. Walker says, "Burns, run for Senate, we'll support you. But if you run for governor, we'll have to fight you all the way." Well, that made him run for governor. But that also tells you that they were really concerned. I mean, the people here in Hawai'i, the big interests. The Chamber of Commerce and the business people, the Big Five, which had been operating at that time. They were really concerned, they were scared of what statehood can bring and will do to Hawai'i. They were really concerned.

As a matter of fact, I might move just away from here, they even poisoned the mind of Wall Street. I'm going a little ahead now. In 1962 when Burns got elected, they passed the word down in Wall Street that we got a Communist governor now. You see, the Communist propaganda was very strong here in Hawai'i. And so, when you bring that up, say up to Wall Street, and says, "Hey, you guys better not put any money in Hawai'i or do anything like that in Hawai'i because we got a Communist governor now." And so, Burns had to go all the way up to Wall Street to answer questions and straighten these things out. And I believe Mr. [Matsuo] Takabuki and somebody else went along with Mr. Burns to straighten these things out with the people in Wall Street.

But as I was saying, they were really concerned about Hawai'i and they were really scared. They didn't know what was going to happen. And therefore, they came all out in 1959. And that was the one election, as I recall, the plantations, the managers and everybody else got really involved. Directly involved in Quinn's campaign. They all got involved. And the plantations just provided Mr. Quinn with any and all possible aid in campaigning. But subsequently, they haven't done the same thing. You see. This is after Burns beat Quinn in '62. But that's a different story again. Quinn beat himself, I would say, in '62. But after Burns got elected and proved himself to be an upright citizen and not the Communist that they said he was going to be and all of that, well, things have changed. They didn't fight him as hard or all out as they did in 1959. I know people say that had Burns come home, he might have made a difference. I don't know. I doubt it very much. But the other side of the story, there was lot of unfinished business in Congress that he had to attend to. And he just couldn't afford the time to come home to Hawai'i and go back and get his business finished in Congress.

WN: Do you think Mr. Burns received the credit for statehood that he should have gotten?

DA: No. I presume you're asking me if Burns got his full share. And my answer would say, no. Because I think Burns should receive more

credit than he's been given. But you know and I know that they're not going to lay back and say, "Oh, yeah, Burns, you got it all." Right? And I don't know how many other people will say this, but, as I've said it time and time again, they were never for statehood. And this is why they were never successful. But the fact that they had used that issue so much and so often, when statehood did come by, they had to be part of it. And so, what they're saying is, that, well, statehood would have eventually come anyway because of their efforts. Now, this is why during the statehood celebrations they put so much emphasis on the other people saying, well, because of the groundwork that [Samuel W.] King, and Quinn, I mean, Farringtons and what have you, have put in, that Burns merely put the cap on. But if they really studied the situation, Burns's tactics were completely opposite of what they were doing. This is why he was successful. And as I said earlier, too, Burns brought this matter to Joe Farrington and mentioned about this straight admission bill which would prevent having to go through the Rules Committee. He brought this matter to Joe Farrington. Joe Farrington kicked him out of the office. Now, I told you about Hayden from Florida. He says, "You come in with one [elected] representative and I'll vote for you for statehood."

He [Farrington] says, "Hell, I'm deserving of two and I'm going to come in for two."

"Get out of here."

"Okay," he says, "Fine. I'm against you."

Instead of making friends, he was just making enemies on one side, and on the other hand, he says, "I'm for statehood. I'm going to get statehood for you." You got to put two together.

WN: When the time came to sign the statehood bill, Eisenhower didn't invite Burns. How did you feel about that?

DA: I think that was the greatest mistake, or smallness on the part of Eisenhower. I don't know. I blame Eisenhower for that. Whether the people in Hawai'i had any influence on that or not, that's beside the point. But you always blame the man that's at the very top, and Eisenhower was the one. Even Rayburn pointed this out to the President, the grave mistake that he had done of not inviting Burns to the signing ceremony. But to add insult to injury, you know, when the President signs a bill, he signs with several pens and passes them onto the people around there. And he asked Rayburn if he wanted a pen and Rayburn says, "Hell, no. On second thought, oh, yeah, give me one. I'll give it to Burns." Which he did, okay? But that was just like adding insult to injury. But it was a real partisan operation, that's what it was. It was shameful the way it was handled, but, well, that's all water under the bridge.

CC: Speaking of water under the bridge, it's been a number of years since statehood. Personally, what's your personal view of what's been

accomplished? Was it worth it? Would you do it again? How do you feel about it?

DA: Yes, as you look back, I'd like to just compare it, as simple, maybe, as saying, like baking a pancake. You know, you just flip the whole thing and you completely turn from one side to the other. I think we've made a major change in Hawai'i. We've flipped Hawai'i completely around to the benefit of all the people of Hawai'i. Oh, naturally, I can't say all, but to the mass people, you might say. For 90 percent of the people.

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

CC: Well, here we are, celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of statehood. As you observed before, there's lot of water under the bridge at this point. Has it been worth it? Would you do it again? And what's been really good about it and are there any negatives that you see?

DA: Well, I can't think of anything that's negative. I think it's a wonderful thing. And as you said, if I had to do it all over again looking at things the way things are and looking backwards, yes, I would do it all over again. It was exciting, interesting, and very satisfying. But let me just say that as far as statehood is concerned, it was a wonderful thing. It was just exactly what Mr. Burns said, that bringing statehood to Hawai'i would be the greatest thing for the people of Hawai'i, and for the state of Hawai'i, and for the country, as a matter of fact. And, you know, as I was saying, I've said this many times, I think we've made tremendous changes here in Hawai'i. We've turned Hawai'i completely over. And the very things that the hegemony and Big Five been trying to preserve here in Hawai'i for so long, we've succeeded in turning things around, changing. We changed the tax laws, we changed the land laws. We improved the educational program. The Republican party has always said that they were for public education, but they never demonstrated that. And this is true nationally as well as locally. But we had the chance of improving things to the point where we've given the people the dignity that they deserve and given them the opportunity to do what they want to do, and to develop Hawai'i as they want to develop themselves. Now, time has gone by to the point where I don't think we'll ever get back to that old times again, but we brought Hawai'i to the stage now, where the people can . . .

(Taping stops, then resumes.)

CC: Why don't we pick it up with some of the accomplishments. What do you see some of the real accomplishments for Hawai'i are since statehood?

DA: Well, basically, the biggest thing that I can think of is that the people are now participating in their own government. And they are now determining their own destiny as far as Hawai'i is concerned. I think this is the biggest change that we've made. The people

themselves decide what they want. And the day that they're dissatisfied with the Democrats, they're going to have the Republicans come in. I think the time is coming when the so-called long Democratic reign in Hawai'i is going to end one of these days. And then the Republicans are going to have a chance to come in and do their part. And if they fail, the Democrats are going to have a chance to come back again. This is the kind of chances that we never had before. But in terms of the changes that came about it was basically in the areas of land, taxes, school, attitude that we have toward the unions. You know, these are basically the areas that we've worked around.

CC: You said that at least now there's a chance that more than one party can have a chance. Before, that was never true.

DA: That's true, that's true.

CC: But do you think that people are seeing today that government's gotten big and they don't. . . . I mean, don't you sense that there's a feeling of dissatisfaction amongst the public about how responsive government is and if they're being addressed . . .

DA: Isn't that true throughout the country? And I think that reflects down in Hawai'i as well. And as long as we have a democracy and a socialistic system, you might say, we're going to continue in this fashion. But it's gotten to the stage that up to now, they've just been on a go, go, go. But I think now, they're beginning to talk of a balanced budget and they're getting to be concerned about the inflation and the debts of the nation as well as the states. I listened to that tape last night on TV about the big Senate race that's going on in [North] Carolina. And the governor came up, that even in the South, the candidates are beginning to change today. The Democrats from the South are not the same Democrats that we used to elect many years ago. They are concerned, they are interested in civil rights, you know, and things like that. And that they are concerned about balanced budget and things like this. Everyone is talking about balancing the budget.

In Hawai'i we've been concerned about that from the very beginning when we came in in 1955. Prior to 1955 many a times the legislature didn't even finish the session. And toward the end, they would just say, "Oh, heck, Governor, you settle the whole thing yourself," and they walked out. But they were not responsive. But today, ever since 1955 when the Democrats came in, we said that we were going to finish our session within the prescribed time, which we did most of the time. I think, majority of the time. We have to extend the sessions once in a while of late. We've come out with balanced budgets. And we've tried to work within ourselves. But we're beginning to find that we're having to pinch here and there from now on. But not up to now. But, as I said, things are changing. It's a chance the Republican party can come in.

I'd just like to point this one point out. When we started, as I

said, Mr. Burns got the 442 and the 100th Battalion involved very heavily in politics. We were the angry ones coming back from war. We felt that we had a place here, that we had a job to do, complete our job. At the same time, we were labeled, as Mr. Burns was afraid of, being labeled as a Jap party. And for a long time, I believe we did have that semblance, but as of late, you begin to find now that we're beginning to get other people involved into the political system. And I think this is wonderful. It's going to be a time when we're going to have, as I said, the Republicans coming back. The Democrats, the shade is going to begin to change. And we're going to have everybody participating, and it's going to be all for the better of Hawai'i.

WN: What do you think is the more significant date in Hawai'i's history? [Nineteen] fifty-four when the Democrats turned over the hegemony or '59 when statehood was achieved? If you were to choose one date as being significant.

DA: Well, I don't know that you can separate the two. Oh, wait awhile, now. Yeah, I think '54 would be the most significant date. That made it possible for the election of Burns who was able to get statehood through. But without statehood, we would not have had this continuation, you might say. Without statehood, we would not have the chance to determine our own destiny, as you say. We would not be a sovereign state. We would still be under the thumb of Congress. And it would have been a very difficult operation because the governor would have been appointed by the president, and so was the judiciary. But now, we elect our own people. We have our own judiciary. And we determine everything for ourselves. And what becomes of Hawai'i is entirely our own responsibility. And so, I hope that we did our share. It's for the younger generation to carry on now, and I hope that we left them something where they can do something about it and continue building Hawai'i for the better.

CC: That's good. Good place to end, yeah?

WN: Thank you very much.

END OF INTERVIEW